


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

DIA review(s) completed.

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
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SECRET**FAR EAST****Communist China: *Is Mao Ill?***

Peking's decision to curtail sharply the traditional National Day celebrations on 1 October almost certainly was due to a major internal political development perhaps precipitated by the illness of Mao Tse-tung. Several Western press services, attributing their information to diplomatic observers in Peking, report that preparations for the major rally scheduled for National Day were inexplicably suspended last week; this has since been confirmed by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cancellation of these festivities is unprecedented. Peking's decision does not appear to have been taken by a plenary session of the party central committee but by a smaller group of central politburo figures.

**Mao Tse-tung**

The regime apparently had intended to put on a spectacular show. The French AFP correspondent in Peking reported on 21 September that beginning in late August thousands of parade participants were seen daily practicing in formation at Tien An Men Square and that workers were busily constructing floats for the parade. He noted that these preparations came to an abrupt halt at the "beginning of last week." This would suggest that the decision to scale down the celebrations was probably made on or about 12 September.

The most obvious explanation for the regime's reluctance to put on its traditional show, with its mandatory leadership turnout, is that a

key member of the ruling politburo is seriously ill. Mao Tse-tung last appeared on 7 August and his designated heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao, has not been seen since early June. Premier Chou En-lai, Madame Mao, and other important civilian politburo members evidently are not seriously ill since they have made public appearances in the past few days. Despite the fact that frequent public absences by both Mao and Lin are not unusual, Mao has never missed a National Day celebration; the assumption he would not appear

this year has triggered intense speculation concerning his health. It seems highly unlikely that Peking would delay an announcement of his death for as long as one week. Chinese Communist spokesmen in Hong Kong and at several Chinese embassies have claimed that Mao is in excellent health.

Another possible explanation is that the jockeying for position that has been under way within the ruling politburo for some time has taken a new turn. Since last March, four civilian members of the 25-member politburo have dropped from public view for varying

lengths of time. They appear to be in serious political trouble as a result of a prolonged investigation into extremist policies associated with the Cultural Revolution. Recently, there have been tenuous indications that the investigation has broadened to involve key military figures. Over the past week, all but one of the military leaders on the politburo have failed to make public appearances, a possible indication that they are

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involved either in further behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Peking or, if Mao really is ill, in discussions on maintaining leadership unity and internal security.

The nonappearance of China's ranking military authorities and the cancellation of preparations for the 1 October rally have coincided with a nationwide standdown of most military flights since 12 September. Thus there may be a relationship between this unprecedented suspension of flight activity and internal political developments.

So far, there has been no public reaction in Peking to the decision to scale down National Day festivities. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that cancellation of the usual parade in Peking and other major ceremonial activities throughout the nation is merely a "reform" designed to change the traditional way of celebrating the holiday. This rationale appears singularly thin given the abruptness with which the unprecedented decision apparently was taken, the continuing standdown in military flight activity, and other anomalous developments, which all convey the impression that the decision was prompted by some major problem besetting China's unsettled leadership coalition.

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Communist China: *Drumming Up Business Abroad*

Peking's dispatch of several high-ranking trade delegates abroad has highlighted China's effort to strengthen international economic and political ties, particularly with European states. The minister of foreign trade is to head a delegation to France, Italy, and Algeria next month. The trips to Paris and Rome are to reciprocate similar visits to Peking during the past year and to assess interest in increased trade, while the stop in Algiers will concern, at least in part, utilization of a recently concluded Chinese credit agreement.

China's deputy foreign trade minister, who recently completed a visit to Guyana, is currently on a tour of Scandinavian countries, meeting with industrial representatives and political leaders. China's minister of light industry has been visiting Yugoslavia over the past week in conjunction

with Peking's participation in the Zagreb trade fair for the first time in over ten years. Later this month, Chinese textile experts are expected to visit Italy, France, and Switzerland.

With these initiatives, the Chinese are attempting to exploit foreign interest in developing a larger China market; Peking hopes to gain support from these countries for its international political position. At the same time, face-to-face contacts with foreign industrialists will further refurbish the international business community's confidence in China, badly damaged by Peking's erratic behavior during the Cultural Revolution. Wider trade relations, particularly with developed European states, also may enable the Chinese to obtain much-needed sophisticated equipment at favorable prices.

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Indochina


South Vietnam: Thieu Under Fire

Opposition is mounting against President Thieu's plan to run alone, but he seems determined to ride out the storm. Radical student groups in Saigon are taking a leading role in the protest movements so far. They have made fire-bomb attacks and have caused the most violent confrontations with police since the student and veteran demonstrations more than a year ago. American personnel and property have been attacked in Hue and Saigon. Student protests are focusing on Thieu's referendum policy, but other long-term grievances, such as compulsory student military service, are also at issue.

The feeling of crisis in Saigon may have been intensified by a number of seemingly random, violent actions; last week, an explosion devastated a night club in the middle of the downtown area, and this week terrorist attacks were reportedly made against the country's foremost labor leader and a prominent senator. Critics are likely to speculate that the government is somehow involved in these incidents. It seems at least equally likely, however, that they are the work of the Communists or radical opponents of the government bent on heightening tensions.

A surprising number of personalities and groups who have backed Thieu in the past have

It is clear that Vice President Ky and his staff are actively supporting the students and that they still are trying hard to rally all anti-Thieu factions, including veterans and religious, political, and military groups as well as students, into a united front. Ky has close ties with some veteran groups and apparently has gained ground among the students. He also has approached Big Minh and may have won over some members of Minh's staff. But Big Minh himself as usual is wary of being used by Ky, and it is questionable whether the two will be able to cooperate.



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been adding their voices to protests against the referendum.



Stirrings of dissent also are being heard in the National Assembly from former Thieu supporters as well as from long-term oppositionists. A Lower House bloc has adopted a manifesto urging that all means be used to oppose Thieu's re-election. The Upper House has passed a resolution criticizing the President's tactics and urging him to step down while a new, contested election is organized.

Despite this heavy fire, Thieu retains over-all control of the situation. The army still seems to be behind him, the An Quang is not on the attack, and the various opposition elements are having trouble agreeing on a specific alternative to the referendum plan. The population in the countryside outside of Saigon, among whom Thieu has cultivated support for years, is largely indifferent to the concerns of students and other urban political factions. These considerations will work in Thieu's favor during the turmoil of the next couple of weeks, but it seems likely that he will have to do a good deal of fence-mending if he

hopes to restore political stability in the cities over the longer term.

Enemy Action Up

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Communist attacks inflicted fairly substantial allied casualties in several parts of South Vietnam last week. The most damaging assault was conducted by a sapper unit against a major South Vietnamese command post just west of Tay Ninh city early in the week. The assault was preceded by a heavy mortar and large-caliber rocket barrage—a new twist in sapper tactics. It accounted for 21 South Vietnamese troops killed and 63 wounded, against 54 of the attackers killed and seven captured.

Most Communist attacks this week were staged by local force and sapper units, but in the western delta the Communists are deploying larger units against South Vietnamese troops attempting to clear the U Minh Forest. In the most vigorous enemy countereffort since the government operations began there late last year, the enemy is accepting heavy casualties in order to maintain pressure on positions established by the South Vietnamese 21st Division. This enemy action has probably been prompted by the need for the North Vietnamese 95th and 18B and the Viet Cong D-2 regiments to defend important base camps in the forest. The actions, however, could also be in response to appeals from higher commands for attacks in strength before President Thieu's referendum on 3 October.

There have been a number of exhortations to increase military harassment and intimidate voters in order to disrupt the balloting throughout South Vietnam. Most of these have called for stepped-up activities from 20 September through 5 October. Major North Vietnamese combat units could begin larger scale offensive activities in some regions, the DMZ area and the central highlands for example, but these are more likely

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to occur after the monsoon rains ease in mid-October. [REDACTED]

Cambodia: On the Road to Kompong Thom

Government forces are resuming their drive to reopen Route 6 to the long-isolated town of Kompong Thom. The light enemy resistance that the Cambodian Army's Chenla II operation has encountered since it was launched a month ago probably prompted Prime Minister Lon Nol to reverse his earlier decision to halt the drive at Kompong Thmar, at the junction of Routes 6 and 21. Four battalions from the Chenla II task force have now occupied Tang Krasang. They are expected to continue the effort to clear the remaining 15 miles between that town and Kompong Thom.

The success of Chenla II appears to have stimulated the army high command to begin mapping out similar campaigns to reopen sections of other key highways during the dry season. A senior army officer recently told the US defense attache that Phnom Penh's plans call for reoccupying Route 15 north of Prey Veng, reopening Route 7 from Krek to Tonle Bet, and clearing Route 3. The officer also said that Lon Nol is still talking about trying to retake Kratie Province, although other Cambodian leaders recognize that this would be a very difficult and ambitious undertaking.

The Communists' failure to offer any significant opposition to Cambodian units on Route 6 has been in keeping with the generally conservative military posture they have maintained during most of the rainy season. Relying on economy-of-force tactics, they have focused on harassing a

number of other main lines of communication. In recent weeks, they have been particularly active in the northwest, where they have carried out a series of disruptive actions against Route 5 and the rail line running from Battambang to Phnom Penh. Enemy elements have also been putting more pressure on Siem Reap town.

Enemy activities were capped by another "spectacular" in the Phnom Penh area when, on 19 September, the Communists struck Esso and Shell petroleum storage tanks with rocket and mortar fire. The attack was the most significant action in Phnom Penh since the raid last January on the city's airfield. Eight of the 14 tanks at the Esso facility and six of the 15 tanks at the Shell facility were damaged; 2 million gallons of fuel went up in smoke.


The damage has produced a temporary disruption of petroleum supplies for Phnom Penh's civilian population, and gasoline rationing has been reinstituted. Military operations will not be affected. [REDACTED]

The Cambodians currently have a surplus of chartered petroleum vessels and can use some of these as floating reserves until the stationary tanks are repaired. [REDACTED]

Laos: Preparing for the Future

Both sides in north Laos are preparing for the dry season, no more than a month or so away. Restrained by policy considerations from probing farther eastward, Vang Pao's irregulars are digging in on the ground they already hold and are trying to take a number of tactically important positions


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Paksong

Their logistical preparations are clearly under way. [redacted] most of the roads east and immediately north of the Plaine are in excellent shape despite air attacks and monsoon rains, and [redacted] increasing amounts of supplies are being moved to the Communists' forward positions. [redacted]

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Vang Pao's forces this summer captured nearly 1,000 tons of supplies, including 863 tons of food, 88 tons of ammunition, and 12 tons of weapons. This is only about one eighth of the amount they lost to Vang Pao in 1969. Although the losses will set back the Communist timetable, the supplies can be replenished within a relatively short time.

on the northern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. The irregulars lost these positions in late August.

Consolidating in the South

The North Vietnamese, although they have been avoiding large-scale attacks, have been trying to keep the irregulars off-balance. Some enemy troops have redeployed to contest Vang Pao's moves north of the Plaine, but otherwise the North Vietnamese have given no firm sign of where or when they will start the offensive to retake the Plaine.

Government forces are continuing to expand their control around the town of Paksong, taken on 17 September. Several high-ground positions have been occupied and additional government units have been flown in. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the final battle; government forces lost 58 killed and 137 wounded with 45 still missing while the enemy had 134 known killed and 20 wounded. [redacted]

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PHILIPPINES: President Marcos last week reinstated the writ of habeas corpus in 27 of the Philippines' 66 provinces because, he said, the "Communist insurgency" has substantially ended. Habeas corpus was suspended on 23 August after grenades killed ten people at an election rally in Manila. Marcos' action in suspending the writ brought heavy criticism that he had overreacted and was trying to use the bombing incident to move against his political enemies. Although

Marcos' recent action will dampen the criticism, opposition leaders have been quick to point out that the suspension of habeas corpus is still in effect in the populous areas of central and eastern Luzon, Mindanao, and in other regions in which antigovernment dissidence is strong. In particular, the writ remains suspended in the Manila area, scene of the most active opposition to the Marcos regime. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Korea: *Verbal Sparring*

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The preliminary stage of the bilateral talks between the North and South Korean Red Cross delegations on the problem of divided families began on 20 September with both sides jockeying to gain the advantage. Pyongyang adopted a conciliatory tone at the meeting and sought to upstage Seoul by claiming credit for proposing the talks. The North Koreans also urged that the talks move ahead swiftly and held out the possibility that they could soon evolve into full-fledged bilateral negotiations on the unification of Korea. Pyongyang's position is clearly designed to improve its domestic and international image, specifically in anticipation of a discussion of the Korean question at the current session of the UN General Assembly.

Seoul is using the talks as leverage for requesting a postponement of substantive discussion of the Korean question at the UN lest its position suffer from repercussions of the Chinese representation debate. At the same time, the South Koreans are attempting to prevent the talks from moving too rapidly in the direction of political discussion. Speaking at a cabinet interpellation on 14 September, Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil ruled out any consideration at the talks of national unification within the next decade. Under-scoring this official view, Seoul has drawn up a scenario for spinning out the preliminary stage through detailed negotiations on the place, date, and agenda for the plenary session. The South Koreans did press for a continuation of the preliminary sessions at the meeting on 20 September, but they may decide not to inhibit progress in order to avoid domestic and international criticism for foot-dragging on an extremely popular national issue.

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EUROPE

Mixed Tidings from Brandt-Brezhnev Meeting

Chancellor Brandt's visit to the Soviet Union on 16-18 September produced no major breakthroughs but did provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views between West German and Soviet leaders. The meeting represented another step toward removing the aura of distrust that has surrounded contacts between the two countries and thus helped to normalize relations.

Brandt returned generally optimistic about Soviet policy toward Western Europe and West Germany, but without illusions as to Soviet willingness to make his task much easier, particularly on the inter-German negotiations. Brezhnev declined to intervene with the East Germans in support of Brandt's argument that the second-

phase Berlin talks must proceed on the basis of an agreed German text of the Four-Power accord. Thus, a test of wills, similar to that which characterized the earlier Four-Power talks, continues between Bonn and Pankow, though the impasse will probably be broken eventually.


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Brezhnev and Brandt During Crimea Visit

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On East-West questions, Brezhnev projected an image of flexibility and interest without exerting any pressure on Brandt. He convinced the chancellor that Moscow wants an early confer-

ence on European security, but agreed with Brandt's wish to drop from the communiqué the phrase "in the near future," which Soviet drafters had suggested. 25X6

On the question of mutual and balanced force reductions, Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet position that the talks should not be limited to the US and USSR or to the area of Germany and that foreign and indigenous forces should be included—positions generally conforming to NATO's. In addition, he made a nod toward NATO's concern for "balanced" force reductions by saying that, while he objected to "balanced" as a NATO word, reductions should be effected "without detriment to the participants."

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USSR: *Brezhnev Widens His Personal Role*

Following his success last spring at the party congress, where he significantly strengthened his personal position, General Secretary Brezhnev is broadening his role from party boss to that of world statesman. In the former role, he dealt primarily with the party leaders of other Communist countries, generally leaving official Soviet contacts with the rest of the world to Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny. His talks last week with West German Chancellor Brandt and his forthcoming trip to Paris mark his emergence in his new role for which he has clearly been preparing himself.

Commenting on the meeting, Brandt noted signs of Brezhnev's increased self-confidence since the chancellor's visit in August 1970. On that occasion, Brezhnev had many papers and read from them frequently. This time, Brezhnev alone saw the chancellor and, in Brandt's view, he went out of his way to make the exchange a state-to-state and government-to-government one. He discussed matters in a more relaxed way and only

occasionally consulted the few papers that were in evidence.

Soviet press treatment of the Brandt-Brezhnev talks has left no question as to who is in charge of this area of the USSR's foreign policy. Large front-page pictures and prominent articles have emphasized the extent to which Brezhnev alone dealt with Brandt. Moreover, *Pravda* on 18 September also front-paged a letter from North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan thanking Brezhnev for a previously unpublished message of sympathy on the flood in North Vietnam. According to Le Duan, the message was sent by Brezhnev personally in the name of the party central committee and the "Soviet Government." The latter is a formulation usually reserved for Premier Kosygin or President Podgorny.

It is a measure of Brezhnev's relative lack of firsthand experience with the rest of the world that his Paris visit next month will be his first trip to a non-Communist country since he became

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party chief in 1964. As the Soviet president in the Khrushchev era, he went to Finland, Africa, Iran, and South Asia. His only trips to Western Europe during that period, however, were to Italy to attend the funeral of Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, and a private one-day visit to the Brussels Exposition in 1958.

Brezhnev's course propels the party deeper into the realm of operational diplomacy as opposed to policy formulation and, like his foray into planning problems in the Council of Ministers 18 months ago, tends to encroach somewhat

on Premier Kosygin's preserves. Despite the shift in their relative roles, however, Brezhnev seems to be continuing to operate within the framework of collective leadership. For example, he broke off his working vacation in the Crimea immediately before Brandt's visit there and made a brief trip to Moscow, apparently for last-minute consultations with his colleagues on the Politburo. Moreover, both Kosygin and Podgorny have extremely active travel schedules themselves—the former to Algeria, Canada, Norway, and Denmark, and the latter to Hanoi and Iran.

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Monetary Developments: *Urgent Waiting*

Following the meeting in London last week of the Group of Ten, the EC Council again debated on 20-21 September possible responses to the new US economic program. It did not advance beyond the community's previous position of urging abolition of the US import surcharge as a condition for realigning exchange rates. Since London and other European capitals generally agree with the EC line, little progress is expected toward meeting US demands at the sessions this weekend of the Ten in Washington or the annual IMF meeting that follows immediately.

At the beginning of the week, reports in the German press that Washington was seeking a 15-percent revaluation of the mark caused the mark to rise sharply against the dollar. Because the Bundesbank failed to intervene Monday, many foreign exchange dealers believed Bonn would accept a higher revaluation. The Bundesbank, however, did enter the market Tuesday when the effective mark revaluation approached 10 percent. This was the first intervention by Germany's central bank in a month, and it represents a decision to hold the effective revaluation vis-a-vis the dollar to around 8 percent. Other currencies also floated upward: the Belgian "financial" franc for the first time appreciated more than 5 percent above its old parity; the Dutch guilder was up about 6.25 percent; and the British

pound rose to about 3.25 percent over the former rate. In part, the renewed pressure on the dollar reflected the belief that substantial European revaluations would be required before the US would agree to any increase in the dollar price of gold or remove the 10 percent import surcharge.

Official and press comments on the London session of the Ten have ranged from characterizing it as a "dialogue of the deaf" to occasional more hopeful analyses. The London *Times*, for example, took heart from the general agreement that currencies need realignment and that radical remedies are required to restore equilibrium to the US balance of payments. The paper also noted that no one any longer envisages a huge increase in the gold price, adding that multilateralism is not dead when everyone agrees on the need for study on the international level of the currency realignments necessary to bring about a reversal of US deficits. Nevertheless, the political drumfire on the US persists. There is evidence from discussions in NATO and elsewhere that the US program, and specifically the linkage between remedying US payments and reducing US military expenses in Europe, are detracting from an attitude of mutual trust likely to be increasingly necessary to upcoming discussions on East-West issues.

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Within the community, Germany is advocating greater understanding for the US position. The French continue privately to underscore the "shameful American challenge," as one high Quai official termed the new economic program, and to lament the strong position vis-a-vis the Europeans which the US has gained by "acting so brutally." A press release issued by the EC Council on 21 September toned down the bitter attitudes held by some officials among the Six, evidently because the community sees little to be gained at the moment from emphasizing possible retaliation. Even so, more is likely to be heard in the immediate future about "compensatory" measures that members might take to offset the

import surcharge and proposed US tax legislation designed to improve the US trade position.

Although the community holds that unity is a prerequisite to international agreements on monetary questions, France and Germany in particular remain at odds over how to shape an internal EC system that could serve as a unit within an international reform scheme. Many observers believe that Paris wants some devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold in order to "offset" any revaluation of the franc that might result from refixing rates within the EC.

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INTERNATIONAL OIL: The eleven members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) this week approved a resolution calling for "participation" in Western oil company operations within their respective borders. Details are to be published on 7 October, but the program is expected to call for an initial 20-percent equity in oil production. The resolution probably has been carefully formulated in an effort to avoid any linkage to the five-year revenue pacts laboriously worked out earlier this year between OPEC and the Western oil companies. Never-

theless, further lengthy and acrimonious bilateral negotiations are expected soon and will involve most of the wholly owned subsidiaries of the large foreign oil companies operating in the OPEC countries. Some existing arrangements between oil companies and the governments already provide for participation. Algeria, for instance, has nationalized 51 percent of all oil operations, and Nigeria is negotiating an agreement with one company for 51-percent participation in offshore oil development.

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NORWAY: Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli's ruling Labor Party suffered a drop in popularity in local elections held on 19-20 September. Labor received only 42.4 percent of the vote compared with 44.0 percent in the last local elections in 1967. The only major issue in the two-day elections was Norway's proposed membership in the European Communities. While the relatively small Center Party, a member of the former coalition government, scored significant gains by opposing Norwegian membership, the election failed to provide a clear-cut verdict on the issue. Last year,

the EC entry issue split the ruling bourgeois coalition and ushered in the present minority government. The recent election results are likely to reinforce the Center Party's opposition to EC entry, thus perpetuating the coalition split. Although the former coalition parties could theoretically unite to unseat the Labor government at any time, this is not likely to happen until the EC question is out of the way. That is not expected to occur before next summer at the earliest.

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Italy's New Regional Governments

Government decentralization is proceeding despite long-standing concern that the move would improve the Communists' political position and increase administrative inefficiency. The new regional governments do seem in fact to be adding to the Communists' political standing, but the party apparently is not operating in an authoritarian or exclusive manner. The effect of the reform on governmental efficiency seems likely to vary considerably from one region to another.


Regional leaders are now absorbed in the preparation of comments on the initial drafts of the decree laws. They have become aware that the regions will be better able to deal with Rome if they stand together when their interests coincide, and they realize also that many seemingly localized concerns are part of larger problems affecting other regions, even distant ones. Consequently,

Regional administrations throughout the country were required by Italy's constitution of 1947, but their establishment—except in some special cases—was long delayed. Assemblies for the regions were not elected until May 1970. The assemblies then elected regional executives, of which three were Communist or Communist-Socialist while the other twelve were centrist, often with Christian Democratic leadership.

All of the new regional assemblies have now enacted constitutions, and these have received the required endorsement of the national parliament. The statutes of the Communist-dominated regions show no significant political differences from the statutes of non-Communist areas.

The regions are constitutionally entitled to legislative and administrative powers within as yet unspecified limits in a number of fields including urban and rural police, agriculture, forestry, public welfare, town planning, and public works. To assure an orderly transition from national to regional authority in these areas, Rome will issue decree laws to define boundaries between regional and national competence as well as to provide essential central government coordination and supervision. These laws will probably be in effect next January, although some may be delayed until January 1973.

ITALY: The New Regional Governments

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representatives of various regions have been meeting from time to time on an ad hoc basis.

Officials of the three Communist-run regions have participated in such cooperative exchanges. They have been consulting freely with non-Communist regions, particularly in the industrial north, and have avoided any exclusive dealings among themselves. Even the more conservative Christian Democrats show little concern about cooperating with administrators of the Communist regions.

The effect of the new regions on over-all administrative efficiency seems likely to depend largely on the quality of the various regional governments. The Communists have been notably thorough in setting up their bureaucratic machinery and are utilizing the best Communist administrative talent of their regions.

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UK-Malta: *Deadlock Finally Broken*

After several months of intense negotiations, which at times appeared to be at the breaking point, the UK and Malta agreed last weekend on procedures and a timetable for the negotiation of a new defense and financial agreement. The deadlock was broken in talks between Prime Ministers Heath and Mintoff in London. The two leaders agreed that financial terms should be worked out within three months and a detailed agreement completed within six months. Mintoff implicitly accepted the UK-NATO cash-aid offer, which is expected to rise to \$24 million, on the understanding that bilateral aid from individual NATO countries be negotiated promptly.

The Maltese leader agreed to lift restrictions placed on British forces on the island and to restore the previous arrangements, which gave London a veto over third-country military use of Malta's airfields and harbors. Mintoff made clear, however, that his dependence on the West would not be as complete as that of the former government. He told Heath that regular visits by the US Sixth Fleet would be acceptable, but with the clear understanding that "very occasional" courtesy visits by Soviet naval forces would be

required to maintain Malta's neutrality. Further, Mintoff implied that he would agree to the establishment of a Soviet Embassy on Malta.

NATO approved the Heath-Mintoff agreement on 21 September and has instructed its military budget committee to meet as soon as possible to work out financial details. The British are contributing a little over half of the \$24 million annual package, most of which is in the form of a direct cash payment, and have promised to pay a portion of the total by 30 September. The US, Germany, and Italy are the other major contributors, with smaller amounts expected from Belgium, Canada, and Iceland.

Mintoff is already turning his attention to striking the best bargain possible in bilateral aid negotiations. In talks with Chancellor Brandt following his London visit, Mintoff tried without success to get Brandt to "quantify" Bonn's bilateral aid intentions. He also failed to get a German commitment to expand its previous offer of approximately \$7.3 million in technical assistance plus equipment.

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Mintoff probably will not entirely abandon his tough bargaining techniques as he negotiates bilateral aid pacts and the final details of the agreement with London. He apparently did conclude that his "brinksmanship" tactics would not result in a bigger Western offer. He also was

probably impelled toward a settlement by his concern over the possible quid pro quo that Libya or the USSR might ask in return for substantial aid, and by his realization that the Maltese remain basically pro-Western. [REDACTED]

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Denmark: *Election Results Produce no Majority*

To no one's surprise, Denmark's quadrennial parliamentary election on 21 September gave neither the incumbent center-right coalition nor the chief opposition party a majority in the next parliament.

Jens Otto Krag, head of Denmark's largest party, the Social Democrats, called on Prime Minister Baunsgaard to resign and clear the way for Krag to form a minority government. A former prime minister himself, Krag had said before the election that he would form a minority government, with the tacit parliamentary support of the left-wing Socialist People's Party, if his party regained the seven seats it lost in the 1968 election and if the incumbent coalition lost its majority. As it turned out, the Social Democrats gained eight seats, for a total of 70 of the 179, while the coalition lost its majority, dropping from 98 to 88 seats. Krag would have the support of two and possibly three of the four representatives from Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, although this will not be confirmed until 5 October. With the tacit support of the Socialist People's Party, which jumped from 11 to 17 seats, Krag would have the backing of 89 or 90 of the 179 deputies.

Baunsgaard, whose Radical Liberals were the only one of the three coalition parties to emerge

unscathed, has refused to resign pending a recount, but it should not improve his situation. Baunsgaard has not been willing to reconstitute his coalition as a minority government.

If Krag forms a minority government, he may well find broad support for his domestic program, which has not differed markedly from the coalition's. On foreign policy, however, he may drift somewhat to the left in areas where there is some identity of views with the Socialist People's Party while seeking to avoid contentious issues on which the two parties differ. The government could pursue a cut in defense spending and a retrenchment in the defense establishment, and it may extend diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam. But it could decline any initiatives on the divisive issue of Danish entry into the European Communities, which will in any event be decided next year by popular referendum.

The difficulties facing a minority government are likely to be so great, however, that Krag may call for new elections during 1972. He would probably wait until after the referendum on the EC so as to keep this question out of the election. [REDACTED]

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

India: *Mrs. Gandhi Tightens the Reins*

Prime Minister Gandhi's dominance over her Ruling Congress Party is becoming more apparent. In the six months since she led her party to an overwhelming victory in national elections, she has made several bold moves that highlight her growing political power.

Last July, she forced the resignation of Mohan Lal Sukhadia, chief minister of the predominantly Hindu northern state of Rajasthan. Sukhadia had held the state's top political office for 17 years and, until Mrs. Gandhi's low-key but relentless attack against him began, his position seemed inviolate because he appeared to possess an independent political base. Sukhadia was replaced by Barkatullah Khan, a Muslim who owes his new job to no one but Mrs. Gandhi. Earlier this month, Mrs. Gandhi moved against Brahmananda Reddi, chief minister of the southern state

of Andhra Pradesh, whose domination of local politics had made him one of the most powerful figures in the Ruling Congress Party. Reddi's successor has yet to be named, but Mrs. Gandhi has made it clear that she will do the choosing.

With Reddi's fall, pundits in New Delhi are openly speculating about the prospects of Maharashtra State's chief minister, V. P. Naik, a member of Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan's inner circle. Chavan was Maharashtra's chief minister until he left some years ago to accept a position in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet. The prime minister probably sees Chavan as her greatest potential rival for power, and has long been interested in eroding his support.

Although all four men declared their allegiance to Mrs. Gandhi when the Congress Party split in 1969, they were all ranged against her in various degrees before the split and mutual trust has never been high. With the two dismissals, Mrs. Gandhi will gain a free hand to ensure that candidates of her choice are nominated by the local Ruling Congress to represent the party in state electoral contests, scheduled to take place by March 1972.

The two high-level dismissals, together with other local Ruling Congress purges, have stimulated rumors in New Delhi of imminent cabinet changes. Mrs. Gandhi last manipulated her cabinet in March, when younger people were brought in to fill subcabinet offices, but little new blood was infused into the ministerial ranks. Mrs. Gandhi doubtless wishes to upgrade the "progressive" image of her government and make it more responsive to her dictates. Her recent actions indicate that she may now feel strong enough to move in this direction.



Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

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Pakistan: *Bleak Prospects for Reconciliation*

President Yahya Khan continues to take steps ostensibly aimed at improving the domestic political situation but probably designed primarily to assuage international criticism of his government. His recent efforts are unlikely to improve relations between Pakistan's two wings.

In East Pakistan, a civilian cabinet was appointed on 17 September by A. M. Malik, the civilian provincial governor named earlier this month to replace an unpopular West Pakistani general. Malik and his cabinet ministers all are East Pakistanis, but he shares his authority with a West Pakistani general who holds the post of martial law administrator.

Adding to Malik's—and Yahya's—problem is the suspicion with which army leaders in the East regard any move toward civilian government.

Islamabad has also announced that by-elections will be held in East Pakistan in December to



President Yahya Khan

fill seats that became vacant last month when the government disqualified a majority of Awami Leaguers who had been elected to the national and provincial assemblies. The large number of disqualifications, together with the likelihood that many of the "acceptable" legislators probably will decline to take their seats, will dilute whatever legitimacy these assemblies might have had in the eyes of the East Pakistanis. Additionally, there is considerable doubt that government forces will be able to remove the threat of guerrilla actions before the poll.

In a measure aimed at increasing civilian participation on the national level, Yahya has agreed that the new constitution to be drawn up by his government will be submitted to the national assembly for its consideration before being proclaimed by the executive branch. The assembly will have 90 days to suggest revisions; Yahya retains the power to veto any recommended changes.

Another action taken by Yahya earlier this month—the announcement of an amnesty for most East Pakistani insurgents—does not appear to have made much of an impression so far on the Bengalis; the latest measures will not do much either to lessen their hostility toward Islamabad. Bengali leaders have indicated that as long as Awami League chief Mujibur Rahman remains imprisoned, they will not respond favorably to Yahya's political moves. Mujib is currently being tried in secret for treason before a military tribunal, and is expected to be found guilty and possibly sentenced to death. The sentence has to be reviewed by Yahya, whose decision to uphold or commute it could indicate whether he intends to pursue a hard or a conciliatory line in future dealings with the Bengalis.

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
Egypt-Israel: *All Quiet on the Canal*

There have been no further incidents along the Suez Canal following the Israeli air strikes on 18 September. The sequence of events that led to the Israeli action began on 11 September when the Israelis shot down an Egyptian SU-7 conducting low-level reconnaissance of Israeli positions along the canal.

The Egyptians retaliated for the loss of the SU-7 on 17 September when they used missiles to shoot down an Israeli C-97 which, according to the Israelis, was flying "well on the east side of the canal." Seven of the eight Israeli crewmen were killed. Because the plane was over Israeli territory and unarmed, an Israeli response was almost guaranteed. The following day, the Israelis responded with air strikes at Egyptian SAM sites along the canal. Israeli aircraft first flew along the canal to induce radar emissions from seven pre-selected sites between Ismailia and Suez City. Then eight Israeli Phantoms launched a total of 12 Shrike missiles at the targets from the Israeli side of the canal. None of the Shrikes hit the targets, however, and all seven sites were still operational when the Israeli planes left the area. The Egyptians launched missiles at the Israeli planes during the attack, but the Israelis were out of range and no missile came close.

The Israelis probably regard their action, even though not a success, as a sufficient warning to the Egyptians of Israel's intention to respond forcefully to future Egyptian acts against Israeli forces. The Egyptians have claimed that they suffered no losses as a result of the Israeli action, indicating that they are probably willing to regard the events of last week as a closed chapter.

Neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis appear to desire an escalation of the fighting in the near future. The recent events, however, have illustrated the basic fragility of the present cease-fire and the way in which military action by either side is likely to provoke reactions.



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Egypt: *Sadat Speaks Out*

President Sadat's words and actions during the past week reflect his determination to focus international attention on the Middle East and to put his personal stamp on the restructuring of the Egyptian state.

In a nationwide address on 16 September, Sadat took the US to task for its "failure" to define its own position on a settlement of the Middle East dispute. Although he claimed that the Americans had given up their role as "mail-man" between Egypt and Israel and that they had even misrepresented the positions of the disputants, Sadat stopped short of denouncing US mediation efforts. Instead, he called for a UN Security Council session at some unspecified time so that the international community could "shoulder its responsibility" toward the Middle East. By using these tactics, Sadat seemed intent both on goading the US into wringing concessions from the Israelis and on refocusing international attention on the continued deadlock in the talks. He no doubt views the shootdown of the Egyptian SU-11 and the Israeli C-97 in the past two weeks as having the merit of reminding Washington of the fragility of the cease-fire and the dangers inherent in the protracted diplomatic impasse.

Although foreign policy overshadowed the domestic aspects of Sadat's speech, he did outline plans for a broad reorganization of the state ap-

paratus and the economy. The central theme of this portion of his address was that the reforms were not ends in themselves but were instead necessary in order to build a new domestic foundation for the "battle."

Among the significant specifics of his action program, Sadat has directed the simplification of the cumbersome bureaucratic processes that have hampered expansion of industrial production. New legislation will provide for tighter guarantees to foreign investors and for the creation of industrial "free zones" where customary trade restrictions will be waived to facilitate the formation of new export industries.

The first step in government reorganization was taken on 19 September when Sadat appointed a new, modified cabinet. Although the key members were retained, several ministries were abolished and two new ones—war production and maritime transport—were created.

Sadat has portrayed Egypt's new constitution, which came into force on 11 September, as his administration's blueprint for the building of a modern industrial society. Since dismissing those who shared power with him last May, Sadat has given high priority to the reshaping of governmental, political, and economic institutions.

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Yemen (Sana): A New Cabinet

Muhsin al-Ayni, 39-year-old diplomat and politician, accepted the premiership and appointed a cabinet late last week. The cabinet, with its many old faces, is composed of both right- and left-wingers. The naming of military officers as deputy premier and as ministers of interior and communications reflects the army's key role in national politics.

In addition to the post of premier, al-Ayni has also assumed direction of foreign affairs. The previous holder of the portfolio was an Adeni whose appointment had been interpreted as signaling stepped-up assistance for Adeni dissidents operating out of Yemen with Saudi Arabian backing. Although al-Ayni is known to oppose the radical government in Southern Yemen, his in-

tentions toward it have not yet been spelled out. In the past, he has supported the idea of a "Greater Yemen," but it is likely that he will be less intransigent toward the Aden regime than his predecessor, who favored a military solution. Al-Ayni has re-established a Ministry for Unity Affairs, which may indicate that he intends to launch a propaganda campaign in favor of uniting the two Yemens.

In an interview, al-Ayni declared that positive neutrality and nonalignment would characterize Sana's foreign policy. Although this may be rhetoric, it could also signify hesitancy about resumption of relations with the US. [REDACTED]

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Malagasy Republic: Tsiranana Rides High

President Tsiranana's pre-eminence was reaffirmed at the conference of the ruling Social Democratic Party earlier this month. In a carefully manipulated vote, Tsiranana was designated, without opposition, as the party's presidential candidate for the national election scheduled for early 1972. He also solidified his control over the party's executive body, renamed the political bureau, and apparently became party chief for life. Moreover, the President downgraded the post of party secretary general, last held by discredited former vice president Resampa. Resampa, before his downfall, was Tsiranana's heir apparent and a potential rival. According to a new party statute, Tsiranana will appoint the secretary general annually from among the members of the political bureau, who are also appointed by the President.

Tsiranana's renomination means his almost certain re-election to the presidency. The government's prestige was badly damaged by a bloody uprising last year in the southern part of the island and by the detention of Resampa for alleged coup plotting. Tsiranana, however, has recently made an effort to soften the effects of these events with a series of country-wide personal appearances. His opposition in the election will be modest at best; the main opposing party, which won only three of the 107 seats at stake in the last legislative election, has so far failed to nominate a presidential candidate.

Tsiranana may have more in mind than just another seven-year term. According to rumors

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circulating in Tananarive, he may be planning to become president for life. Tsiranana was apparently impressed by the election of President Banda of Malawi to a life-long term last July. It has also been rumored that Tsiranana may call for immediate elections, instead of waiting until 1972 as scheduled. Such a move would be unconstitutional, but this factor would probably not dissuade the mercurial Tsiranana, who advanced the date of the 1965 presidential elections.

The party conference also endorsed Tsiranana's policy of developing closer ties to South Africa. Relations between the two countries were put on a more formal footing last month with the establishment of a joint commission that will examine, among other things, customs problems, trade, and technical assistance. The party's endorsement increases chances that Tananarive may establish diplomatic relations with South Africa, a move the Malagasy Government has recently hinted it is considering. [REDACTED]

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Ethiopia-Japan: *Growing Economic Ties*

Ethiopian economic relations with Japan have grown substantially. Tokyo has found an enthusiastic trade partner in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia has been host to numbers of Japanese missions searching for export markets, investment opportunities, and sources of raw materials.

A number of Japanese-financed factories have opened during the past year and imports from Japan increased by more than 50 percent in 1970 to \$25 million. Japan's climb to second place as supplier of imports has been at the expense chiefly of the US, UK, and France, all of whom suffered an absolute decline in exports to Ethiopia last year.

Exports to Japan—primarily coffee—are increasing rapidly but are still overshadowed by imports, which last year were almost four times the value of sales. While Addis Ababa has sought

out Japanese industrial projects that reduce its needs for imports, these have frequently led to high-cost production. The cost of products from recently inaugurated factories producing garments and steel pipe, for example, will be higher than previous imports. Furthermore, Ethiopia is procuring only one Japanese factory—a meat-processing plant—that is designed to spur exports.

Earlier this year, Japan attended for the first time the meeting of the international consortium providing aid for Ethiopia. Ethiopia may hope that Japan will provide sufficient aid to counterbalance any reduction from the US, currently the chief donor. Addis Ababa is trying to step up implementation of an already much-delayed development program. The current budget places heavy emphasis on development expenditures, with more than half the capital outlays expected to come from foreign borrowing. [REDACTED]

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Breakup of East African Community Seems Possible

The four-year-old East African Community is threatened by the political tensions that have arisen between Tanzania and Uganda since the coup in Kampala last January. Despite some beneficial developments, the community has not fostered the hoped-for regional unity and its breakup would not be deeply felt, especially since most present common services could probably be salvaged.

The community's operations—common economic and communications services for these two countries and Kenya—are stymied by Tanzania's refusal to recognize the new Uganda Government. This blocks any meeting of the community's governing authority, consisting of the three heads of state, which must approve major decisions. At present, only routine business is conducted, and continuity is maintained through informal contact by lesser officials. A number of important fiscal and administrative matters need to be unresolved, however.

Since its inception, the hoped-for regional unity of the grouping has been impaired by retrogressive measures and petty jealousies: the demise of a single east African currency, the creation of competing industries, the imposition of exchange controls, and the restriction of worker movement. Furthermore, economically advanced Kenya is restive over being "held back" in favor of the others, while Uganda and Tanzania

feel that Kenya's industrial economy has grown largely because of its unrestricted access to their markets.

Nevertheless, the community has been mutually beneficial in some aspects. East African trade with the world, conducted largely under a common external tariff, has expanded rapidly in recent years. With a market of about 35 million people having an income of about \$3 billion annually—relatively high by African standards—the community provides one of the most attractive markets in Africa to foreign investors and creditors. In practice, however, most of the industry has gone to Kenya, by far the most receptive to foreign capital.

Some worth-while features of the community probably could be salvaged should it break up. The free trade area and the four present East African corporations—originally established by the UK to handle railways, harbors, telecommunications, and postal services—probably would be maintained. Moreover, the close economic relationship between Kenya and Uganda would probably survive because Kampala is dependent on overland transport routes via Kenya for its exports and imports. Tanzania, because of its limited resource base, would suffer most, offering further openings for the Chinese Communists. ()

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Brazilian Extremists Dealt New Blows

During the past two weeks, radical opponents of the Medici government have lost a top terrorist leader and have seen several priests sentenced to prison on charges of aiding subversives.

On 17 September, military and civilian security forces located and killed renegade army Captain Carlos Lamarca and a companion, culminating an extensive manhunt in the northeastern state of Bahia. The 33-year-old Lamarca had become the central figure in the terrorist movement since his desertion from the army in early 1969. Under his leadership, the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard carried out extensive operations in urban centers, including bombings, bank robberies, and three of the four kidnappings of foreign diplomats. Unrelenting pursuit by security forces beginning in late 1969 cut deeply into his strength, however, resulting in dissension within the group that apparently caused Lamarca to leave it in March 1971.

Lamarca and several followers went to the hinterlands of Bahia in late July to prepare for rural guerrilla activities, but the authorities learned of his presence before he was able to gain significant support among the populace. His entrapment demonstrates anew the hazards that face Brazilian terrorists who attempt to shift their operations from a known urban environment to an unfamiliar rural one. Lamarca was the last active figure in the circle of terrorist leaders who once headed the several groups that advocate vio-

lence against the government; his loss will be a severe psychological blow to the subversives. It may force them to adopt less visible, and therefore less vulnerable, methods of operation. These would also be less effective.

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Another setback to the extremists was the conviction on 14 September in a Sao Paulo military court of four priests charged with violating national security laws by collaborating with the National Liberating Action group of Carlos Marighella, Lamarca's predecessor as principal terrorist leader.

Although their prolonged detention without trial has been the subject of frequent protests, church officials apparently were satisfied with the four-year sentences meted out to the three defendants who faced the most serious charges; a fourth defendant received a six-month term, while eleven others were acquitted.

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The hierarchy's restrained reaction to the convictions may warn the small number of radical clerics that they can expect little assistance from ranking church leaders if they become involved with extremists.

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Argentina: *Election Date Set*

President Lanusse's announcement that national elections will be held on 25 March 1973 may have been prompted by the rising level of civil unrest and the notable increase in rumors of military plotting. The announcement of elections—the first for president since 1963 and the first for congress since 1965—was made nearly a month earlier than originally planned with the apparent intention of sidetracking or pacifying Lanusse's critics.

The rumors of military plotting against Lanusse that have circulated widely in Buenos Aires are to some extent a reflection of dissatisfaction with the President's policy of accommodation with the Peronists and his failure to deal with the nation's serious economic problems. The unrest at this time, however, may be more directly attributed to the confusion and apprehension over army promotions and assignments, which reportedly are being made early this year. Lanusse reportedly is in the process of moving his most loyal military supporters into key troop commands to frustrate any coup plotting, and many officers are angered over the favoritism being shown presidential "cronies."

Business and labor groups are agitated over the President's failure to deal effectively with the sagging economy and spiraling inflation. Lanusse must have the support of the large and well-

organized Peronist labor movement if he is to be successful in returning Argentina to elected government. Moderate labor leaders are generally satisfied with the President's performance so far, but pressure from more radical groups has forced the moderates to make a show of opposition to the government's economic policies. The national leadership was able to outmaneuver the radicals, who were calling for a series of active nationwide general strikes, but only by calling for a "passive" general strike on 29 September. Any overreaction by security forces during the strike would cost Lanusse heavily in political terms, but, in any case, it is becoming obvious that he must soon show some success on the economic front or risk losing all the political gains he has made since coming to power six months ago.

With the announcement of an election date, President Lanusse retains the political initiative and demonstrates the political astuteness that has served him well thus far. The announcement has been generally well received by the public and should reduce the threat of a military coup, which now would be interpreted as a move against the expression of the popular will at the polls. Similarly, it should temporarily quiet the President's civilian critics and give the government more time to devise a new economic program. [REDACTED]

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HONDURAS: Tottering President Cruz has gained a temporary respite from the disorders threatening his "unity" government. Bombings have tapered off over the past two weeks, and bad weather has apparently dampened student enthusiasm for demonstrations. The last significant bombing occurred on 14 September when ex-

tensive damage was done to the United Fruit Company office in Comayaguela across the river from Tegucigalpa. Two other bombs were found unexploded later in the week. General Lopez, chief of the Armed Forces, says the reduction in violence may be a result of increased police patrolling, especially at night. [REDACTED]

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Peru: Strike Increases Influence of Communists

The recent nationwide teachers' strike has increased the influence of the pro-Moscow Communist labor federation (CGTP) at the expense of the more moderate APRA labor leaders and of the extreme leftists in the labor movement.

The military government in recent months has displayed an ambivalent attitude toward the CGTP. Since coming to power in 1968, it has looked on the confederation as a means of destroying the labor federation controlled by APRA, with which the army has been at odds since the 1930s. For a while last month, the administration seemed to be moving toward an open crackdown on the CGTP's sponsorship of labor stoppages, especially those at government-controlled installations. The government denounced agitators of both the extreme right and the extreme left, and President Velasco, while blaming rightists for the government's problems, said that the Communists had become unwitting tools of the right.

The CGTP, having gained influence in the labor movement by associating itself from the

beginning of the strike with the teachers and their legitimate grievances, began working behind the scenes for acceptance of the government's compromise offer. As a result, the government charged APRA and the "ultraleft," but not the CGTP, with attempting to manipulate the strike for "partisan and counterrevolutionary" purposes. The APRA federation jumped on the teachers' bandwagon only after the strike was under way, but it was Apristas and members of extremist splinter groups who were arrested on 13 September for counterrevolutionary activities.

The government apparently hopes to break the back of APRA, which has had strong labor support, then turn its attention to the Communists if necessary. The willingness of the leaders of the CGTP to cooperate with the Velasco regime will encourage this attitude. New troubles could develop, however, if the government goes through with its plan to impose a new law removing the trade union movement from politics. Such a law could bring a direct confrontation with the CGTP, with possibly serious consequences for the already fragile economy.

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URUGUAY: The campaign for the November presidential elections is proceeding apace, with all three parties able to point to some recent progress. In the incumbent Colorado Party, Jorge Batlle has emerged from internal party elections as a likely—and strong—contender for the presidency, along with the several other Colorado candidates allowed to run under Uruguay's complicated electoral system. If the Colorados are able to attract the law-and-order vote via President Pacheco's renomination and field several other attractive candidates as well, they will be favored to retain the presidency. The campaign of the principal Blanco candidate, Ferreira Aldunate,

continues to attract good turnouts in the capital, and his proposed reformist program of government is designed to enable the traditionally conservative Blancos to draw on the dissent vote that the leftist Frente Amplio is attempting to monopolize.

The Frente recently received a modest boost when the Uruguayan Bishops' Council publicly affirmed that Catholics could in good conscience vote for any of the three parties, thereby somewhat undercutting the two traditional parties in their attempt to picture the Frente as a Communist front.

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UN Developments

Security Council Takes up Jerusalem

As of noon on 23 September, the Security Council had yet to resume last week's two-day debate on Israeli actions in Jerusalem. Continuing intra-Arab disagreement over the terms of a draft resolution has held up reconvening of the council.

The Arab discord that has surfaced in New York reflects the long-standing dissatisfaction of some of the more radical states, led by Syria, with Jordan's desire to work out a resolution that would be palatable to the US. Syria took a tough stance against Amman's position at the meeting on 11-12 September of Arab League foreign ministers and wanted an indefinite postponement of any council debate. Jordan pushed ahead, however, because it hoped that its scenario for a quick vote in the council could still be achieved. Amman also could hardly have afforded to back down on a matter it regarded as vital and on which so much diplomatic capital had been expended during the summer months.

Debate speeches have covered the usual gamut of charges and countercharges. The ten Arab statements have all played on the theme that Israel is "bent on Judaizing Jerusalem" and is thus violating the UN Charter and numerous resolutions. Israeli replies have focused on the alleged Jordanian trampling on the rights of Jews in Jerusalem during the 1948-67 period and have accused Amman of using the Jerusalem issue to divert attention from its problems with the other Arab states.

Soon after the council convened last week, the Syrians offered to the Arab group an alternative text that would have sent a council mission to Jerusalem and have required it to report back within 15 days. The draft also cited the possible need for UN sanctions against Israel. The Soviets favor such language, largely because they want any mission to be under the auspices of the council rather than the secretariat.

Reacting to the Syrian move, the Jordanians have consulted intensively within the Arab group on alterations of the text agreed to between Amman and Washington. Jordan now maintains that Syrian UN delegate Tomeh has given "his word" to support an amended draft that would not refer to UN sanctions or use the formula for a Security Council mission. Should the original Jordanian-US text be presented, Syria probably will offer a number of amendments.

The upshot of these developments, combined with the presence in New York of many foreign ministers from the states concerned, is to upgrade the significance of any council vote that may occur.

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Africans Gird for Major Initiatives

The Africans have obtained a special high-level meeting of the Security Council for next week to consider South Africa's continuing assertion of hegemony over South-West Africa. The session should be the high point of African efforts

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at the UN this fall, which will also focus on the Portuguese territories and the Middle East situation. The activism of the Africans contrasts sharply with their relative stand-down at the UN last year and denotes their increasing frustration on anticolonial issues, something that OAU Chairman Ould Daddah is certain to stress next week.

Impetus for the council meeting on South-West Africa was provided by the International Court of Justice in June, when it issued an advisory opinion upholding the action of the General Assembly in 1966 terminating Pretoria's mandate over the territory. Ould Daddah will make the principal speech before the council, and five OAU foreign ministers are also scheduled to make statements. The council's ad hoc committee on South-West Africa is drafting a report for council consideration, and the Africans appear inclined to push for a text that would call for UN sanctions against South Africa should it—as is certain—fail to withdraw from the territory. Another reference unpalatable to the West would provide a controversial interpretation of the council's arms embargo against Pretoria.

The Africans have been angling for years to have the General Assembly designate delegates of the national liberation movements for the unrepresented Portuguese territories in the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The assembly is slated to vote this fall on the issue, as all Western attempts so far to defer the matter have failed. The Africans may well have the votes needed to secure the designations to the ECA. If successful, this could spark similar moves on behalf of dissident groups elsewhere.

Rhodesia has been a focal point of African concern for years, but the Africans have not

indicated that they have any new moves in mind regarding Salisbury.

The OAU is sending a special committee of self-designated "wise men" to Cairo and Tel Aviv in early November to look into prospects for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Last fall, African support greatly aided the Arabs in rolling up a 57-16 majority in the assembly for a contentious resolution strongly opposed by the US and Israel. The Arabs have indicated they are willing to await the conclusion of the OAU mission before commencing this year's assembly debate on the Middle East. The Israelis hope to persuade the OAU mission to favor a more balanced text.

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The War on Drugs

The meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the UN Economic and Social Council, which opens next week, could eventually lead to a considerable stiffening of international legislation to deal with drug traffic. The US hopes to use the session to obtain more support for amending the 1961 convention to provide mandatory powers for the International Narcotics Control Board, which presently can only call for voluntary compliance with the convention. The enforcement amendments, about which many countries have reservations, are to be considered formally at a high-level diplomatic conference next year. The UN Drug Commission meeting is also likely to produce greater adherence to the recently completed convention on psychotropic (mind-bending) substances, which permits coverage of the LSD problem for the first time.

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